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Volume 35, Number 1 -- November 2001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTICLE
PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE PRESENCE: IDENTITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN MACPHERSON V. BUICK
by Jonathan Kahn
In
this Article, Professor Jonathan Kahn examines how conceptions of
corporate identity are constructed. The Article goes back to the early
twentieth century to consider how the legal processes and institutions
came to endow corporations with attributes that gave it a specific type
of
identity. More specifically, Professor Kahn focuses on the law of product
liability and Benjamin Cardozo’s path-breaking opinion in the 1916
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. to illustrate how the determination
of corporate responsibility and liability, in particular rules of torts,
implicitly located, shaped, and bounded corporate identity and power
in
society. Professor Kahn chooses to focus on the doctrine of product liability
since doctrinally tort law, especially the law of negligence, involves
issues of agency, will, and responsibility. Tort law invokes these
principles to establish the corporation’s presence in its products
and
thereby to define critical aspects of its identity.
TOLERATION, APPROVAL,
AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY: ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
by Mark Strasser
In
this Article, Professor Mark Strasser argues for legal recognition of
same-sex marriage. Strasser examines the difference between toleration
and endorsement in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and makes clear
why that distinction militates in favor of rather than against recognizing
same-sex unions, commentator’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
He also examines the difference between protected and permitted conduct,
which commentators have used by analogy in an attempt to show
why same-sex unions need not be legally recognized, and shows why
this distinction, properly understood, establishes why same-sex marriage
must be accorded as a matter of right rather than as a privilege which
may be accorded or withdrawn at will by the legislature.
SILENCE
by Marcy Strauss
In
this Article, Professor Marcy Strauss notes that, since its adoption,
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been interpreted
in a myriad of ways. The boundaries of this privilege are especially
tested when a suspect remains silent pretrial and the prosecution
uses this silence to incriminate. Courts must then draw a fine line between
what is legitimate evidence and what is unconstitutional. Professor
Strauss explores the most recent trends in both state and federal
courts in three situations: postarrest and post-Miranda, postarrest but
pre-Miranda, prearrest and pre-Miranda. Professor Strauss explores the
underlying factors that could influence a defendant to remain silent, why
it would be fundamentally unfair for the prosecution to use that silence
in court, and suggests a clear, comprehensive rule for consistent results
in future decisions. SYMPOSIUM
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
TO OUR CHILDREN’S CHILDREN’S CHILDREN: THE PROBLEMS OF INTERGENERATIONAL
ETHICS
by Lawrence B. Solum
In
this Introduction to the Symposium on Intergenerational Ethics, Professor
Lawrence B. Solum provides a framework for the scope and nature
of intergenerational justice. He uses various simplified cases and
contexts to enable the reader to place these examples within three major
approaches to intergenerational distributive justice: an egalitarian
approach,
a libertarian approach, and a utilitarian approach. Professor
Solum further examines strategies for justifying a theory of intergenerational
justice and the problems involved in formulating such a theory.
He concludes that, while problems arising from the discussion on intergenerational
ethics may shake the foundation of particular theories of
distributive justice, it is important to welcome this challenge as an
opportunity
to reconstruct our fundamental assumptions about morality
and justice.
INTERGENERATIONAL DECISION MAKING: AN EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVE
by Theodore P. Seto
Professor
Theodore P. Seto has developed an evolutionary theory of
normativity, to be described more fully in a separate forthcoming article.
In this Article he outlines his normative model in brief and applies
it to
the problem of intergenerational decision making. He begins by posing
a challenge for all intergenerational theorists -- the “Pleistocene
Dilemma”
--
that he asserts any truly credible theory should be able persuasively
to address. He argues that cost-benefit analysis fails this test
miserably. An evolutionary theory of normativity, by contrast, leads
us
to conclude that the present matters only to the extent that it makes
the
future possible, and that our long-term normative objective should be
the survival, evolution, and integrative expansion of our “We.” This
alternative
approach, he asserts, succeeds. DISCOUNTING IN THE LONG TERM
by Coleman Bazelon and Kent Smetters
In
this Article, Coleman Bazelon and Professor Kent Smetters analyze
choosing a discount rate for evaluating intergenerational public policy
decisions. The authors begin by examining the underlying issues involved
in choosing an appropriate discount rate to assess forthcoming
policies. In addition, the authors discuss the approaches used in discounting
costs and benefits in the far future and the manner in which
these approaches diverge from the standard cost-benefit analysis. Central
to the analysis are beliefs about the rate of future economic growth.
The authors conclude by supporting a policy of using a discount rate
that declines as the time frame of analysis stretches into the future. WHAT
DO WE OWE THE NEXT GENERATION(S)?
by Axel P. Gosseries
If
we have obligations to future generations, how should we define
them? In this Article, Axel P. Gosseries addresses this question by defending
and relating the practical implications of an egalitarian view of
intergenerational justice. He shows that egalitarians are able to justify
the need for an accumulation phase. In addition, he argues that in a
steady-state, each generation should transfer to the following one "neither
less, nor more" than what it inherited itself. Finally, he specifies
exceptions to this principle and contrasts the egalitarian view with
the
reciprocity-based, libertarian, utilitarian, and Rawlsian approaches
to
intergenerational justice.
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