Volume 34 Number 1 -- November 2000
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE SEVENTH ANNUAL FRITZ B. BURNS LECTURE
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND KOSOVO
INTRODUCTION
by Allan Ides
THE WAR IN KOSOVO: FAILED LESSONS OF INCREMENTALISM
by C. Boyden Gray
In his speech, Boyden Gray examines the legality of U.S. actions in
the
war in Kosovo and provides that in the absence of any direct threat to
national security, and without congressional approval, said actions were
of questionable legality (even if a court is incompetent to rule on the
issue).
The humanitarian goals sought by the United States through the
bombings were undermined because President Clinton failed to get formal
congressional authorization of war. Instead, the Clinton administration
approached the war in a graduated and incremental process in order
to avoid having to justify its actions domestically, thus unnecessarily
prolonging the suffering on both sides. During the Vietnam War, President
Lyndon Johnson applied incrementalism to his military operations
and led the nation down an unfortunate path in history. Subsequent
leaders have recognized that incrementalism does not win war. Rather,
incrementalism undermines inter-branch relations between the executive
and legislative branches, as well as prolongs armed conflict. Therefore,
the Clinton administration’s return to incrementalism during the
war in
Kosovo not only failed to profit from the contrasting lessons of the
Vietnam and Gulf Wars but also set a bad precedent for future military
actions.
WAR POWERS AND THE MILLENNIUM
by Paul W. Kahn
In
this Article, Professor Paul W. Kahn argues that scholars examining
Congress’s power to declare war have generally failed to confront
the
most important contemporary issue: reconciling American constitutional
law with the emerging international legal order of human rights.
Congress’s war-declaring power traditionally functioned as a point
of
intersection between the regime of international law and that of domestic
law. Both of these regimes, however, changed dramatically in the
latter part of the twentieth century. With the United Nations Charter,
the category of war disappeared from international law. Internationally,
a declaration of war is now a meaningless act. Domestically, the structural
incapacities of Congress to act in the area of foreign affairs have
substantially increased in the last fifty years. The hope that the wardeclaring
function of Congress can serve a legitimating function with
respect to the use of force is untenable in light of this incapacity.
In any
case, claims that presidential uses of force are not adequately responsive
to the public will mistake contemporary problems for those of the last
generation. Efforts to reinvigorate Congress’s war-declaring power
are
unlikely to serve any significant democratic purpose, but are likely
to
disable the emerging international regime of human rights enforcement.
THE
POWER TO MAKE WAR
by Dennis J. Kucinich
In
his speech, Congressman Dennis Kucinich criticizes the Clinton administration’s
involvement in the war in Kosovo as an abuse of congressional
war-making power. The War Powers Resolution grants the executive
the power to commit the nation to war for sixty days without the
approval of Congress. Congressman Kucinich argues that this power is
an encroachment upon Congress’s war-making power and antithetical
to
the checks and balance system of the Constitution. Additionally, because
the War Powers Resolution did not require congressional authorization
to wage massive war during the sixty days, he believes that the
Resolution became the catalyst for the atrocious abuse of human rights
by U.S.-NATO actions.
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND KOSOVO
by Abraham D. Sofaer
In
his speech, Judge Abraham Sofaer examines the question whether the
war in Kosovo was appropriately authorized by Congress in the manner
provided by the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution
provides that congressional approval is established for a military action
when Congress explicitly declares its authorization in a law pursuant
to
the Resolution’s requirements. Judge Sofaer argues that while Congress
made no such official declaration of war during Kosovo, the measures
that Congress adopted following the deployment of U.S. troops into
Yugoslavia implied authorization and established its approval. As such,
the Resolution’s provision with respect to the form of congressional
authorization
of military action should be repealed because it gives Congress
a way of saying that it did not approve a war that it not only tolerated,
but also condoned and financially supported.
ARTICLES
A COMPARISON OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH AND THE UNITED STATES
by Rev. John J. Coughlin, O.F.M
In
this Article, Rev. John Coughlin compares the administrative law of
the Roman Catholic Church to that of the federal law of the United
States. Rev. Coughlin reviews the procedures for recourse against an
act of administrative power prior to review at the supreme tribunals
of
each system of law. He describes the structures of both the Apostolic
Signatura and the U.S. Supreme Court, and compares and contrasts the
procedural safeguards of the two systems. In addition, Rev. Coughlin
examines the competencies and jurisdiction of each system of administrative
justice. Through this unlikely comparison, the Article promises
to yield significant insight for a wide spectrum of legal experts in
the
fields of comparative law, canon law, constitutional law, and administrative
law.
LAWLESS LAW? THE SUBVERSION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
by Ellen
J. Dannin and Terry H. Wagar
Since the mid-1950s, the United States has witnessed
a dramatic decline in union density -- especially in the private sector.
Studying several
hundred cases decided by the National Labor Relations Board, Professors
Ellen J. Dannin and Terry H. Wagar contend that the court-developed
doctrine of implementation upon impasse, which allows an
employer to implement its final offer upon reaching an impasse, has
now become a tool for lawlessness and has greatly contributed to the
decline of union density. A law enacted to promote collective bargaining,
the authors believe, has, instead, subverted the collective bargaining
process. Since the doctrine has strayed so far from the goals of the
National
Labor Relations Act, the authors propose that the doctrine undergo
major reform or even reversal.
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY ON THE RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW THIRD,
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY
by The UCC Committee of the Business Law Section
of the State
Bar of California
Since its initial adoption, the Restatements have been a source of
authority
and guidance for California courts. The Restatement of the Law
Third, Suretyship and Guaranty is the most modern study and analysis
of law and policy in this field. Although California law on the subject
is
formally codified, this area of California law is to a significant degree
developed and embodied in judicial decisions, giving courts valuable
guidance in construing the California Civil Code in light of modern notions
of suretyship law. Thus, the common law of suretyship continues
to be of significant relevance in California. In this report, the UCC
Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California
offers a commentary on the extent to which the Restatement of Suretyship
is consistent with current California law.
COMMENT
APPLYING MURPHY BROS. V. MICHETTI PIPE STRINGING,
INC. TO
REMOVAL IN MULTIPLE-DEFENDANT LAWSUITS
by Barbara A. Wiseman
In Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., the United States
Supreme
Court clarified that a defendant’s thirty-day time limitation to
remove a case from state to federal court begins to run only after service
of process has occurred. While the Court clarified the time for removal
in single-defendant lawsuits, there has been a split among circuits as
to
how to apply this same time limitation in cases involving multipledefendants.
This Comment analyzes the different approaches taken by
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits in light of the decision in Murphy
Bros. This Comment concludes that courts should follow the Sixth Circuit’s
approach to removal in multiple-defendant cases, allowing each
defendant thirty days from the time in which they are officially served. |